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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Chantel Tucker appeals, contending that the Idaho Supreme Court deprived her 
of due process by denying her request for transcripts, made both in her amended notice 
of appeal and in a subsequent motion to augment the record. She also contends that 
the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over her, or 
alternatively, by not reducing her sentence sua sponte when it did so. The State 
responds, contending that Ms. Tucker's due process rights were not violated and the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction over Ms. Tucker. 
Specifically in regard to Ms. Tucker's argument regarding the district court's failure to 
reduce her sentence sua sponte, the State asserts that issue is not properly before this 
Court, as it must have been raised as fundamental error because Ms. Tucker did not 
affirmatively request that the district court reduce her sentence sua sponte. Ms. Tucker 
deems this reply necessary to address that final contention; the State's other responses 
are unremarkable. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Tucker's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court denied Ms. Tucker due process and equal protection 
when it denied her request in the Amended Notice of Appeal to include 
transcripts necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
2. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Tucker due process and equal 
protection when it denied her motion to augment the record with transcripts 
necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction 




The District Court Denied Ms. Tucker Due Process And Equal Protection When It 
Denied Her Request In The Amended Notice Of Appeal To Include Transcripts 
Necessary For Review Of The Issues On Appeal 
Ms. Tucker acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court recently issued its 
opinion in State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 218-20 (2014), which addressed several of 
the issues raised in her Appellant's Brief on this argument. However, as the State's 
response in this regard is not remarkable, no further reply in this regard is necessary. 
She simply refers this Court back to pages 9-14 of her Appellant's Brief. 
11. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Tucker Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review 
Of The Issues On Appeal 
Ms. Tucker acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court recently issued its 
opinion in Easley, 156 Idaho at 218-20, which addressed several of the issues raised in 
her Appellant's Brief on this argument. However, as the State's response in this regard 
is not remarkable, no further reply in this regard is necessary. She simply refers this 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Ms. Tucker, Or, Alternatively, By Not Reducing Her Sentences When It Did So 
The Fundamental Error Doctrine Does Not, And Should Not, Apply To 
Ms. Tucker's Argument That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not 
Reducing her Sentence Sua Sponte When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over Her 
Ms. Tucker recognizes that the Court of Appeals recently held that challenges to 
the failure to reduce a sentence sua sponte are subject to analysis under 
the fundamental error rule if there was no objection or motion below. State v. Clontz, 
P.3d 2014 WL 2119164, p.4 (Ct. App. May 22, 2014), pet. review filed. 
However, as Clontz is not yet final, it is not controlling on this case. 1 Moreover, there 
are two main reasons why the State's argument to apply the fundamental error standard 
should be rejected: (1) the decision to not reduce a sentence upon relinquishing 
jurisdiction constitutes an adverse ruling against the defendant, and therefore, it is 
properly challenged for the first time on appeal; and (2) given the limitations on the 
ability to file multiple Rule 35 motions, adopting the State's position would lead to the 
filing of preventative appeals, and such an exercise has already been deemed to be a 
useless waste of resources. 
1 In the event that the pending petition for review in Clontz is denied before this case is 
decided, Ms. Tucker would contend, for the same reasons discussed herein, that Clontz 
should be rejected (should the Idaho Supreme Court retain this case) or overruled 
(should this case be assigned to the Court of Appeals), as it is manifestly wrong, unjust, 
and unwise, and so, overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious legal principles 
of law and remedy injustice. See, e.g. Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592-93 (2006) (reaffirming the standard for considering whether 
to overrule precedent). 
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As the Idaho Supreme Court has held, "[t]o properly raise an issue on appeal 
there must an adverse ruling by the court below or the issue must have been 
raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 
McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397 (2003) (emphasis added); see also 
State v. OuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (considering the merits of an argument on 
appeal, even though that argument had not been formally made to the district court 
because the district court had addressed the issue). In regard to the decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals has explained that part of the decision is 
whether the sentence should be reduced or executed as is: 
At the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court may suspend the 
sentence and place the defendant on probation, or may relinquish 
jurisdiction, allowing execution of the original sentence. If jurisdiction is 
relinquished, the court may also reduce the sentence at that time. It is a 
common practice for a trial court to impose a rather severe underlying 
sentence as an incentive for the defendant to perform well in the retained 
jurisdiction program and to comply with the probation terms if the 
defendant is ultimately placed on probation. A lengthy underlying sentence 
also preserves the judge's options until such time as probation may be 
denied or revoked, when the court can decide whether the sentence 
should be reduced. A long underlying sentence thus provides the judge a 
hedge against the uncertainty of the defendant's future performance. 
State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added). Therefore, one 
of the decisions the district court must affirmatively make when relinquishing jurisdiction 
is determining "what prison sentence should be ordered[.] Specifically, if a prison 
sentence previously has been pronounced but suspended, should that sentence be 
ordered into execution or should the court order a reduced sentence as authorized by 
I.C.R. 35?" State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Thus, by ordering the underlying sentence into effect without modification, the 
district court has affirmatively decided that the sentence should not be reduced. As a 
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result, that adverse decision is properly challenged on appeal, even though no objection 
was made below. McPheters, 138 Idaho at 397; DuValt, 131 Idaho at 553. 
Therefore, the State's argument that this issue needs to be addressed under the 
fundamental error framework is misplaced. 
Even if the fundamental error doctrine could apply in this context, it should not, 
since applying that doctrine would have unacceptable adverse consequences on the 
appellate system. As the Court of Appeals has long since held, a defendant need not 
object to the length of her sentence when it is initially imposed in order to preserve a 
challenge to the length of her sentence on appeal after the sentence has been 
executed. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053. In Adams, the State argued, "if a sentence is 
pronounced but suspended, and no appeal is taken immediately from that judgment, the 
defendant has waived any claim that the sentence is excessive." Id. at 1055. The 
Court of Appeals rejected that argument, pointing out: 
Were we to adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is 
waived if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing 
but suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file 
preventative appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday 
might be revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. 
Neither do we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
Id. at 1055-56. The State's argument in this case promotes a similar position, which will 
have similarly undesirable results. Since defendants would have to hold onto their only 
other tool to challenge the initial imposition of sentence (a Rule 35 motion for leniency) 
in order to preserve an appellate challenge to the sentence that might ultimately be 
executed after a potential subsequent decision to revoke probation or relinquish 
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jurisdiction, their only opinion to challenge the initial imposition of sentence would be 
through an appeal from the judgment of conviction.2 
The reason the defendant would have to preserve her Rule 35 motion in this 
manner is because a defendant can only file one Rule 35 motion requesting leniency in 
a criminal case.3 I.C.R. 35(b); see, e.g., State v. Atwood, 122 Idaho 199, 200-201 
(Ct. App. 1992). Therefore, if a defendant has to use her one Rule 35 motion 
requesting leniency in order to preserve an appellate challenge to the sentence 
executed upon relinquishment of jurisdiction or revocation of probation, as the State's 
position would require, she would be unable to use that motion to request leniency after 
the initial imposition of sentence. As a result, her only option to challenge the initial 
imposition of sentence would be to file a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction 
which either retains jurisdiction or imposes a period of probation as a hedge against the 
possibility that the district court might order a prison sentence at some future point. 
Compare Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56 (rejecting a similar argument leading to the 
2 These preventative appeals would appear in both the probation and retained 
jurisdiction contexts because the district court has the same authority to reduce a 
sentence sua sponte when it revokes probation as when it relinquishes jurisdiction. 
Compare State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008) (recognizing this authority in the 
probation revocation context), with State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App. 
2003) (recognizing this authority in the relinquishment context). Therefore, adopting the 
State's argument on fundamental error in this case not only leads to unnecessary 
preventative appeals being filed in future cases where the district court retains 
jurisdiction, but in future cases where the district court suspends a sentence as well. 
3 In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held that an oral request for sentence 
reduction at the time the district court relinquishes jurisdiction consumes that one and 
only motion for leniency. See State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 728 (2013), reh'g denied. 
As a result, the State's argument that the defendant should at least "ask the sentencing 
court to consider a further reduction of sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction" (Resp. 
Br., p.17) still requires the defendant to have retained her one and only Rule 35 motion, 
or else, such a request would constitute an impermissible second motion for leniency. 
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same result). However, forcing a defendant to file such an appeal makes little sense, 
since the only "genuinely meaningful" sentence is the one which is actually executed. 
Id. at 1055. 
Essentially, under the State's position, the courts would be faced with multiple 
appeals challenging a single sentence - one from the initially-imposed sentence and 
one from the ultimately-executed sentence. Adopting the State's position also means 
that the appellate courts could easily end up addressing a multitude of cases where the 
district court retains jurisdiction and ultimately places the defendant on probation, since 
the notice of appeal to challenge the initial imposition of sentence will necessarily be 
filed before the ultimate decision to suspend the sentence after tt1e period of retained 
jurisdiction is made. Therefore, just as the Adams Court rejected the State's argument 
leading promoting a system filled with undesirable preventative appeals, so too should 
this Court reject the State's argument in this case which would lead to the same 
unacceptable result. 
Finally, the State's argument - that the only way to preserve a challenge to the 
district court's decision to not reduce a sentence sua sponte is to have trial counsel 
request the district court to exercise its sua sponte authority (Resp. Br., p.2) - stretches 
language to its breaking point. The term "sua sponte" literally means "[o]f his or its own 
will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion." The Law Dictionary: 
Featuring Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2d ed., 
http://thelawdictionary.org/sua-sponte/ (last visited July 1, 2014) ( emphasis added); see 
also Syth v. Parke, 121 Idaho 156, 161 (1990) ("That action, taken sua sponte by the 
district court was to, on its own motion, reconsider a decision it had earlier reached on 
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a party's motion.") (emphasis added); State v. Dennard, 102 Idaho 824, 826 (1982) 
("Therefore, when the court dismissed sua sponte, there was a motion made, albeit the 
court's own , and I.AR. 11 (c)(3) is applicable.") (emphasis added). Thus, by its 
very definition, the district court cannot use its sua sponte authority upon the motion of a 
party.4 Therefore, the State's argument should be rejected as irrational, as it ignores 
the literal definition of the principles at issue. 
As such, this Court should consider Ms. Tucker's challenges to the district court's 
decision to relinquish jurisdiction and execute her sentence without modification on their 
merits. 
B. Considering The Merits Of The Argument In Regard To The District Court's 
Decision To Not Reduce Ms. Tucker's Sentence Sua Sponte, The Record 
Reveals That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
The State's arguments on the merits of these claims are unremarkable, and so, 
no further reply is necessary. As such, this Court should reduce Ms. Tucker's sentence 
as it deems appropriate, or remand the case for a reduction of sentence pursuant to 
I.C.R. 35 for the reasons set forth in the Appellant's brief. (See App. Br., pp.15-22.) 
4 Rather, the State's proposed solution constitutes a traditional motion pursuant to Rule 
35, see, e.g., Brunet , 155 Idaho at 728, and therefore, requires the defendant to have 
preserved her Rule 35 motion. Thus, the State's proposed solution is not an effective 
solution and only leads to all the problems discussed supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Tucker respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Ms. Tucker respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction and remand this case 
for an order placing her on probation. Alternatively, she requests that this Court reduce 
her sentences as it deems appropriate, or remand the case for a reduction of sentence 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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